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Why We Are Confused about the 
Trademark Dilution Law 
Christine Haight Farley*
Trademark law, like copyright law and patent law, achieves its 
policy objectives by granting what would be monopoly rights but 
for the important limitations on these rights.  In the case of 
trademarks, the stated goal is to prevent consumer confusion.1  The 
law achieves this goal by granting trademark owners exclusive 
rights over a broad and indefinite subject matter for an indefinite 
term.2  Thus, trademark law has a broader subject matter and 
duration than patent and copyright law, but it is narrower in scope 
than the others.  Trademark owners’ rights are saved from being 
over-broad and thus an offensive monopoly by the restriction that 
they be exercised only in situations in which the defendant’s use of 
the mark would be likely to injure consumers by causing 
*  Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  Regan 
Fitzgerald and Brandon Gantus provided invaluable research assistance.  I thank the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal for inviting me to 
participate in this terrific symposium.
 1 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:33 (4th ed. 2005). 
 2 See Lanham Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of section 
8, each registration may be renewed for periods of 10 years at the end of each successive 
10-year period following the date of registration. . .”); see also Lanham Act § 45, 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a 
bona fide intention to use in commerce.”); see generally Viva R. Moffat, Mutant 
Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property 
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1494 (2004). 
While the term of trademark protection has always been indefinite, with 
protection lasting so long as the mark is used (unless the mark becomes 
generic), the subject matter of trademarks has expanded markedly. . . . The 
Lanham Act has been amended numerous times; various acts of Congress and 
decisions by the federal courts have greatly expanded the scope of federal 
trademark protection in the last sixty years. 
Id. 
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confusion.3  Thus, the “confusion test” has been a critical 
limitation on what would otherwise be broad monopoly rights over 
language. 
Dilution is a fairly recent invention in trademark law that 
radically shifts the balance in the law by dispensing with the 
confusion test.4  In its place, this law grants exclusive rights in 
situations in which the defendant’s use “causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark.”5
Dilution has proven to be a “dauntingly elusive concept,”6 in 
the words of the first circuit Court of Appeals to address the law, in 
the decade that it has been a feature of federal law.  Professor 
McCarthy, author of the famed trademark treatise, has stated that 
 3 See Lanham Act § 32(a)–(b), which is incorporated into 15 U.S.C § 1114(a)–(b) 
(2000). 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—(a) use in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive or (b) reproduce, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, 
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in 
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a 
civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 
Id. 
 4 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis 
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 794 (1997); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy 
Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Dilution law, unlike traditional trademark 
infringement law . . . is not based on a likelihood of confusion standard, but only exists to 
protect the quasi-property rights a holder has in maintaining the integrity and 
distinctiveness of his mark.”) (citation omitted).
 5 Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). “Dilution” is defined in 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 to mean “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition 
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, 
mistake or deception.” Id.
 6 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter “Ringling Bros”) (“This case 
requires us to interpret and apply the dauntingly elusive concept of trademark ‘dilution’ 
as now embodied in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.”) (citation omitted). 
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in his forty years of teaching trademark law, nothing has been this 
difficult to explain.7
Even the United States Supreme Court does not “get” dilution.  
In oral arguments in the only Supreme Court case on dilution—
Moseley v. V Secret Catalog8—nearly all of the questions from the 
Justices were seeking to simply understand what dilution is.9  They 
posed hypotheticals, asking the attorneys whether or not such a 
real or hypothetical use would constitute dilution.10  
Disappointingly, none of the attorneys could definitively answer 
these questions or offer any useful definition of dilution.11
Other courts similarly do not get dilution, or else they just do 
not like it.  In oral arguments in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey 
Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., the trial 
judge said to the attorney for the trademark owner, “boy, you must 
have some lobby to get a law like that passed.”12  Other courts that 
have ruled in dilution cases have read additional restrictions into 
the act.13  For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit restricts dilution actions to inherently distinctive marks.14  
 7 J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States 
Compared, 94 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 1163, 1163 (2005). 
 8 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 9 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 2002 WL 31643067 
(hereinafter “Moseley Oral Argument”).  For example, the attorneys were asked to: (1) 
distinguish between “dilution” and “tarnishment”; (2) specify the harm caused to the 
“selling power of a big famous name” where there is a totally separate product with the 
same name; and (3) clarify where “actual confusion” is relevant to “dilution.” Id. 
 10 See id.  In trying to understand the harm against which dilution law seeks to protect, 
Justice Ginsburg posed the hypothetical of Kodak entering a small market to sell monkey 
wrenches. Id.  In particular, Justice Ginsburg questioned the existence of injury where 
there was no tarnishment to the trademark of “KODAK.” See id.  Later in the argument, 
the example of “Delta” was used to understand the scope of protection where there 
existed a Delta Airlines, Delta Faucets, and Delta Peanuts. See generally id., at 22–23. 
 11 See id.  Instead of answering the questions or defining dilution, the attorneys focused 
on the causes of dilution and the extent of proof needed to sustain a dilution claim, which, 
in their defense, was the question certified by the Court. Id. 
 12 Transcript of Oral Argument, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 935 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
 13 See, e.g., Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005); Mattel, Inc. 
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the First Amendment 
limitations of the Lanham Act). 
 14 See Star Indus., 412 F.3d at 381. 
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What these courts are doing can be characterized as “judicial 
nullification”—they are undoing the law because they do not like 
it.15  These courts seem to be uncomfortable with the apparent 
breadth of the new right and are seeking to reign it in with 
additional limitations.16
The Supreme Court in the Victoria’s Secret case also 
evidenced some distaste for dilution, but admirably tried to wrestle 
it down nonetheless.  The Court ultimately failed to define dilution 
and acknowledged this by holding that whatever dilution is, at least 
you have to prove it.17
An unregistered mark is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act if it would 
qualify for registration as a trademark.  To qualify for registration a mark must 
be sufficiently “distinctive” to distinguish the registrant’s goods from those of 
others.  Such distinctiveness may be demonstrated in either of two ways.  The 
mark may be “inherently distinctive” if its intrinsic nature serves to identify its 
particular source.  Alternatively, even if not inherently distinctive the mark may 
be distinctive by virtue of having acquired a “secondary meaning” in the minds 
of consumers. 
Id.  See also TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comm., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 15 “Judicial nullification,” much like “jury nullification,” is the process by which a 
judge knowingly and deliberately refuses to apply the law either because the judge wants 
to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the 
result dictated by law is contrary to the judge’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (8th ed. 2004).  Judicial nullification has been used most 
prominently in the areas of civil justice reform and tort reform. See generally Victor E. 
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullfication of Civil Justice Reform Violates the 
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore 
the Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 
YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
 16 The Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros. required proof of “actual harm” to mark’s 
distinctiveness to successfully prove trademark dilution. 170 F.3d at 464.  In TCPIP 
Holding, the Second Circuit held that only marks that are “inherently distinctive” could 
claim dilution under the FTDA. 244 F.3d at 96. In Mattel, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the 
scope of the “non-commercial use” exemption set forth in the Act by requiring that use 
consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, speech. 296 F.3d 
at 905. 
 17 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003). 
It may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer 
surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through 
circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the junior and senior 
marks are identical.  Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are 
not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a 
statutory violation. 
Id. 
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Why would some of the strongest legal brains not be able to 
grasp dilution?  I will return to this question later. 
When dilution was invented in English18 and German courts,19 
and in the now infamous law review article by Frank Schechter,20 
it was felt that a new legal theory was needed because trademark 
owners could not win a trademark infringement case where a 
defendant used their mark on drastically different goods or 
services.  Thus, the owner of a mark for mouthwash could not 
otherwise win when the mark was used on steel, and the owner of a 
mark for cameras could not otherwise win when the mark was used 
for bicycles.21  It was felt that these types of plaintiffs should win 
because the appropriated marks were highly unusual if not 
fanciful.22  Consequently, the right at that time contained these 
important limitations: 1) the plaintiff’s mark must be unusual or 
fanciful; 2) there must be a wide gulf between the goods or 
services of the parties; and 3) defendant’s use must be an exact 
duplication of the mark.23
But that is not what the present law looks like, and this is not 
what the present world looks like.  In neither the current dilution 
law nor the current bill to amend it is there a requirement for any 
heightened creativity in the mark or any identity in the defendant’s 
use.24  Nor is there a requirement that the plaintiff could not 
 18 Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Ltd. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corporation Ltd. 
(1898) 15 R.P.C. 105 (U.K.) (finding that a bicycle producer cannot use the Eastman 
mark “KODAK,” even though the mark is used for cameras). 
 19 Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 829 (1927) (citing Odol Case, 1924, 25 Juristiche Wochenschrift 502) (discussing 
the “Odol” case, in which a German court prevented the name, originally registered in 
connection with a well known mouthwash, from being used in connection with unrelated 
steel products). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Eastman, 15 R.P.C. 105 (concerning the use of the “KODAK” mark on 
bicycles); see also Schecter, supra note 19. 
 22 See H.R. 11592 § 2(d)(3), 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).  Frank Schechter argued in 
favor of a federal dilution law in testimony before Congress in 1932.  This led to H.R. 
11592 (the so-called “Perkins bill”), which embodied a kind of dilution protection. Id. 
 23 See generally H.R. 11592 § 2. 
 24 See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); H.R. 683, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2005).  The new bill simply sets out a list of “relevant factors” for determining whether a 
mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution.  These factors include: (a) The degree of 
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark; (b) The degree of 
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otherwise win under a confusion action.25  In fact, many dilution 
actions are brought against competitive uses and most plaintiffs 
sue under both theories simultaneously.26
Most importantly, the perceived “gap” in trademark protection 
no longer exists.  Trademark owners who sued to enjoin uses of 
their mark on dissimilar goods or services before the enactment of 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act [FTDA] were by and large 
successful.27  Trademark owners were successful in these 
situations both because trademark protections have expanded over 
time28 and consumers are increasingly exposed to brands that span 
a variety of products and services.29  We are living in an age of 
maximum exploitation of the brand.  Trademark owners are 
licensing and branching out to an incredible extent.30  The most 
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (c) the extent to which the owner 
of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (d) the degree 
of recognition of the famous mark; (e) whether the user of the mark or trade name 
intended to create an association with the famous mark; and (f) any actual association 
between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. Id. at § 2(B)(i)–(vi). 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); see also, e.g., Nabisco, 
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, (2d Cir. 1999); CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, 
P.C., 434 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2006); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 
F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2005); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 
2005); I.P. Lund Trading, ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 27 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allstate, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Tex. 1969) 
(finding that a local ALLSTATE car wash company infringed upon the trademark of 
ALLSTATE insurance company); Waterman-Bic Pen Corp., et. al. v. Beisinger Indus. 
Corp., 321 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granted an injunction to holder of trademark 
“BIC” on its trademark infringement suit against manufacturer of rubber and plastic 
products); Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988) 
(finding that Quality Inns International infringed on McDonald’s trademarks when it 
attempted to use the name “McSleep” for a chain of budget motels); MGM-Pathe 
Communications Co. v. The Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(finding that a gay rights political organization infringed MGM’s PINK PANTHER 
trademark when it called itself the Pink Panther Patrol); Am. Express Co. v. Am. Express 
Limousine Serv. Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting an injunction to 
holder of trademark “AMERICAN EXPRESS” on its trademark infringement suit against 
limousine service using name “American Express Limousine Service, Ltd.”).
 28 See Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting 
the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 
406–07 (2000). 
 29 See Byron M. Sharp, Managing Brand Extension, J. Consumer Marketing Vol. 10, 
Issue 3, at 11 (1993). 
 30 See id. 
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recognizable brands are ubiquitous and applied to a seemingly 
infinite range of diverse goods and services.31  Today, strong 
trademarks cast long shadows so that a case of confusion can be 
made even where consumers would encounter the mark in an 
unrelated area.  Query whether Microsoft would win a trademark 
infringement case against a defendant selling “Microsoft Cola”?  
Microsoft would most probably be successful and it would not 
need dilution law to succeed. 
So why did trademark owners lobby so hard for dilution law?  
It is in part due to the comparatively weak protection for well-
known marks under U.S. law, coupled with our narrower and 
looser protection for unfair competition.  Outside of dilution law, 
U.S. law grants extremely limited protection to famous marks even 
though international treaties demand protection for “well-known 
marks.”32  Far short of our international obligations, and in 
 31 Take for example, a brand like “Virgin,” which has expanded its services to include 
an airline (“Virgin Atlantic”); travel company (“Virgin Vacations”); record store (“Virgin 
Megastore”); and a cell phone company (“Virgin Mobile”).  See www.virgin.com, (last 
visited 7/7/06).  Even a company like “Hooters,” which traditionally had done business 
only in the food services industry, now offers a magazine (“Hooters Magazine”) and even 
runs a small airline (“Hooters Air”). See www.hootersair.com and 
www.hootersmagazine.com, (last visited July 7, 2006).  Perhaps a more famous example, 
and one that has led to legal action, is Apple Computer’s expansion into the music 
business to the consternation of Apple Records.  See Matthew Healey, For a 3rd Time 
Two Apples Meet in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at C8. 
 32 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 art. 
6bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
The countries of the Union undertake . . . to refuse or to cancel the registration, 
and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an 
imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by 
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known 
in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of 
this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. 
Id.  See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 
1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter “TRIPS”]. 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent 
all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of 
trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or 
similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use 
would result in a likelihood of confusion. 
Id. 
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contrast to other countries,33 an old New York common law 
doctrine is the only protection afforded to “well-known marks.”34  
Other countries also offer a more developed set of rights under 
their unfair competition laws, which allow famous trademark 
owners access to prevail in certain cases in which defendants, 
without causing confusion, usurp the goodwill of the mark.35  Most 
of the dilution cases could be resolved under an expanded unfair 
 33 See, e.g., Trade Marks Act, 1994, Ch. 26, § 10 (U.K.). 
A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a 
sign which—(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, where the trade 
mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being 
without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.” 
Id.  See also 1989 O.J. (L 40) 5. 
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade 
any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to 
goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is 
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use 
of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, 
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. 
Id.  See also Davidoff/Gofkid, Case C-292/00 (ECJ 2003) (finding that the EC’s 
Trademarks Directive’s Article 5(2) entitle well-known trademarks to specific protection 
against later identical or similar marks registered for identical or similar goods). 
 34 See, e.g., Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 484–85 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the internationally renown COHIBA mark could only be 
protected in the United States under New York common law as the protections for well 
known marks under international treaties have not been implemented into U.S. law); see 
also Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 759–60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) 
(holding that under New York common law the defendant was enjoined from the use of 
“Maxim’s” for a restaurant in New York, based on the international fame achieved by 
plaintiff’s French mark in the United States before the defendant began its domestic use 
of the mark); The All England Lawn Tennis Club (Wimbledon) Ltd. v. Creations 
Aromatiques, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 1069, 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (owner of the 
WIMBLEDON mark for tennis tournament services, had acquired fame and notoriety to 
have acquired rights in the term ‘WIMBLEDON’ in the United States, and therefore was 
permitted to oppose U.S. registration of a similar mark).
 35 See, e.g., Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair 
Competition], June 7, 1909, RGBl. at 499, last amended June 22, 1998, BGBl. I at 1474, 
translated by the World Intellectual Property Organization, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/fiche.jsp?uid=de059; see also Sony, K.K. v. Yugen Kaisha 
Walkman, 1598 Hanrei Jiho 142 (Chiba D. Ct., Apr. 4, 1996) (finding  that defendant 
violated of Japan’s Unfair Competition Prevention Law and infringed on Sony’s 
registered trademarks, “Walkman” (in English) and “Walkman” in katakana when the 
defendant used the word “Walkman” on signs, bags, and packaging used in connection 
with its small shoe and clothing store.).
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competition law, if such law were to provide rights to trademark 
owners to enjoin uses of their mark that take unfair advantage of 
their fame.  As further proof that these sets of rights are related, at 
present, we are witnesses to the unfortunate collapsing of the three 
in international policy making, leading both to further confusion 
and expansion of rights.36
So what is dilution?  An example that is frequently utilized is 
the use of the famous jeweler’s mark TIFFANY for a restaurant in 
Boston.  What this example is supposed to illustrate is that a 
consumer who encountered the TIFFANY restaurant would 
undoubtedly recall the TIFFANY jewelers, but not be confused 
into thinking that the two are related.  The Supreme Court, 
however, has stated that dilution must be more than mere mental 
association.37  The American Intellectual Property Law 
Association [AIPLA] testified before Congress that “dilution by 
blurring” is the “impairment of the public’s association of a 
famous mark and substantially unique mark exclusively with a 
single source.”38  David Welkowitz, the author of the only treatise 
on dilution, explains the concept as “source distraction.”39  It 
sounds like what is being sought by the trademark bar is statutorily 
enforced mind control.  Indeed, the International Trademark 
Association [INTA] testified before Congress that the injury in 
dilution is to the mark’s ability to “hold upon the public mind.”40
In her testimony before Congress, INTA’s then-President 
hypothesized her own client’s trademark, Pentium, used as a mark 
 36 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (1999), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf. 
 37 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (“at least where the 
marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the 
junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution”). 
 38 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ 
useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=98924.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/1
09_house_hearings [hereinafter Hearing]. 
 39 DAVID WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 67 (2002), & Supp. 2004. 
 40 Hearing, supra note 38, at 8. 
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on real estate services and sportswear.41  She concludes that 
“consumers would learn over time to distinguish between the 
different Pentium brands, their sources, and their brand 
attributes.”42  This hypothetical example is supposed to elucidate 
dilution, but it instead raises further questions.  Why should 
Pentium care if real estate and sportswear companies use the same 
mark where consumers are not confused and can even distinguish 
between the various brand attributes?  What is the harm then of 
dilution? 
Let me suggest that trademark owners desire a likelihood of 
dilution standard rather than an actual dilution standard because 
they cannot prove actual dilution.  There is a good reason that 
trademark owners cannot prove actual dilution. My thesis is that 
there is no such harm; it does not exist. The Supreme Court could 
not provide guidance because they could not articulate the harm 
that needed to be proved.  The trademark bar (as exemplified by 
Victoria’s Secret) takes it on faith that dilution exists and would 
like it to be presumed.  The main problem with dilution law is that 
it provides a remedy without a supportable theorization of the 
harm. Hence the judicial resistance and the efforts by the plaintiffs’ 
bar to make the cause of action more per se. 
I keep asking proponents of dilution to provide me with an 
example of a diluted mark.  So far not one example has been 
provided to me.  During oral arguments in the Victoria’s Secret 
case, the Supreme Court played with some examples of dilution in 
order to try to understand what dilution was and to which marks it 
applied.  Justices asked about the coexistence of brands such as 
APPLE Records and APPLE Computers, DELTA Faucets, 
DELTA Dental, and DELTA Airlines, and FORD Motor Company 
and FORD Modeling Agency.43  These examples were not 
intended as examples that undermined the theory of dilution.  They 
were meant to understand when dilution occurs.  Nevertheless, 
they do demonstrate that famous marks associated with other 
 41 See id. at 13. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 
(2003), 2002 WL 31643067 at *10–11. 
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goods do not invariably suffer the harm of dilution.  So when do 
they? 
I actually do not think that it is a strong sense of harm that is 
motivating the push for dilution protection.  Instead, I think it is a 
strong reaction to a perceived sense of the bad faith on the part of 
defendants.  When defending dilution, proponents frequently state 
that defendants in dilution cases, like Victor Moseley, can only 
have bad faith intentions to use these famous marks.44  So dilution 
protection is desired not so much to protect famous trademark 
owners’ property, but instead to protect against others’ free rides.  
Interestingly, bad faith is not even present in any dilution “test,”45 
as it is under the traditional confusion test.46
The thinking is, “why would this small company use this 
famous mark in their business anyway?”  Why would a start-up 
piano maker use KODAK on their business?  It is a rhetorical 
question whose answer presumably is, “because they want to take 
a free ride; because they want to appropriate goodwill for easy 
gain.”  This understanding of dilution can even be extended to 
expressive uses of famous trademarks like parodies.47  In the 
Congressional hearings on the bill to amend the FTDA, a 
Congressman essentially asked the representative of the ACLU, 
“Why does anyone need to disparage Joe Camel in order to 
criticize cigarettes?”48
 44 E.g., Brief for Respondents at 1, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (“Attempting to ride the 
coattails of respondents’ success in creating a unique and powerful mark with great 
selling power, petitioners used the mark VICTOR’S SECRET . . .”). 
 45 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683, § 2(B)(i)–(vi), 109th Cong. (2006), 
for a list of the “relevant factors” for courts to consider when determining whether a mark 
or trade name is likely to cause dilution. 
 46 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir.), cert. 
denied 368 U.S. 820 (1961) (listing as one of eight factors to determine trademark 
infringement defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 
599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (determining that the intent of the defendant is one 
of seven relevant factors (the Sleekcraft factors) in determining trademark infringement). 
 47 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. V. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding 
proprietor of the “Velvet Elvis” nightclub, which featured velvet paintings, lava lams and 
vinyl furniture, violated the trademarks of the Elvis Presley Estate.  The court, in 
reversing the district court’s finding of a parody, noted the defendant’s intent to 
confuse.). 
 48 See Hearing, supra note 38, at 44–45 (“So your position is that you have to be able to 
rip off somebody’s mark in order to disparage cigarettes?”). 
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If dilution is really about preventing the unfair advantage that 
results from the non-confusing use of a famous mark, then this 
really is unfair competition legislation.  But an unfair competition 
right without strict boundaries could easily become a right in gross 
for the trademark owner.  At an AIPLA Annual Meeting just after 
the FTDA passed, I once heard a lawyer try to explain dilution to 
an audience of trademark lawyers.  The last slide of his PowerPoint 
presentation was picture of a bull’s eye.  He used it to explain that 
previously in order to succeed under the confusion test, a plaintiff 
would need to hit the target.  But now, he cheerfully explained, 
under dilution a plaintiff can win a case if he hits anywhere on the 
board.  I have also heard a similar expression of the “diluted” 
standards of trademark law; that dilution is best understood as 
Confusion with a small “c.”  Just before the Victoria’s Secret case, 
there were 400 cases filed under FTDA.49  This fact demonstrates 
how popular the act was with plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
I frequently get calls from the media when they find out that 
Fox News owns a trademark on “Fair and Balanced,”50 or that 
Donald Trump owns one for “You’re Fired.”51  I have always 
calmed them down by explaining that trademarks can only be 
enforced against those using them in a confusing or misleading 
way.  For example, Al Franken can use “Fair and Balanced” to 
humorously critique Fox News,52 and pottery studios can call 
themselves “You’re Fired.”53  I suppose I may now be more 
optimistic than accurate. 
 49 See Thomas J. McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or 
Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 715 (2004). 
I estimate that as of the end of 2003 there were almost 400 reported judicial 
decisions from both trial and appellate courts interpreting and applying the 
federal antidilution law.  So there is a considerable body of case law precedent.  
Unfortunately, much of the case law does not help make sense of what an 
antidilution law means. 
Id. 
 50 See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18693, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2254 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003). 
 51 See Ameet Sachdev, Trump’s Trademark Plan is Under Fire, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 
2004.  Of course it is still possible too for employers to utter the trademarked phrase. 
 52 Fox News Network, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18693. 
 53 See Sachdev, supra note 51. 
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For the last decade, the biggest question in trademark law has 
been how to prove dilution.  This is a clear sign of something.  Can 
no smart attorney, judge, trademark owner or social scientist figure 
out what dilution is and how to prove it?  If not, why not?  I 
contend that it is because dilution cannot be concretized.  It cannot 
be brought into the realm of the real.  It exists only in the realm of 
the imaginary.  In intellectual property law today, this realm is 
powerful and a bit scary.  It is kind of like the Matrix: You can feel 
it but you can’t touch it. 
If you have not guessed by now, I do not like dilution law—I 
wish we did not have it.  But I do realize that the train has already 
left the station.  Nevertheless, I would like to see some justification 
for this radical expansion of trademark law.  And now as Congress 
has passed a bill54 that would by all accounts weaken the standards 
of a dilution claim, I think this is a good moment to demand this 
justification. 
 
 
 54 See H.R. 683, supra note 45. 
